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The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform
Michael S. Barrf
In the lead-up to the financial crisis, the U.S. financial sector was over-
leveraged, short-funded, risky, and opaque. "Shadow banking" permitted
institutions to avoid comprehensive supervision and capital requirements.
Innovation outpaced the ability or willingness of private- and public-sector
guardians to rein in risks. An asset bubble fed the system, until the market
imploded in the fall of 2008. When the crisis hit, our society found itself ill-
equipped to deal with the failure of leading financial firms. In the wake of the
crisis, the Obama Administration proposed a set of reforms that were
eventually embodied, in large part, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This Essay explores the Act's key reforms:
the regulation of shadow banking, the creation of a consumer financial
protection agency, and the development of a resolution authority to wind down
failing financial firms. The Essay also analyzes the steps that must still occur
domestically and internationally to lay afirm foundation for financial stability.
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Introduction
In September 2008, the United States and the global economy faced the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis was rooted in years
of unconstrained excess on the part of financial institutions and prolonged
complacency among their regulators. It made painfully clear what should have
been apparent all along: that financial institutions cannot be left to regulate
themselves, and that without clear rules, transparency, and accountability,
financial markets break down, sometimes catastrophically. Although the U.S.
government avoided another Great Depression through unprecedented action to
save failing firms and stabilize markets, the crisis demonstrated the need for
comprehensive financial reform, both in the United States and internationally.
In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act'-the most sweeping reform of
financial regulation since the New Deal. The Act provides for major firms to be
supervised based on what they do, rather than on their corporate form. It also
requires the largest financial firms to build up their capital and liquidity buffers,
constrain their relative sizes, and restrict their riskiest financial activities.
Shadow banking-through derivatives, the repurchase ("repo") funding
markets, and securitization-is brought into the regulatory daylight. The Act
does this by comprehensively regulating derivatives markets, with rules
requiring exchange trading, central clearing, transparency, and minimum
capital and margin levels. The Act includes new authorities for data collection
and transparency across the financial market, to make it less likely that risk
could build up unnoticed in a corner of the financial markets. It creates a
mechanism for liquidating failing financial firms without putting taxpayers or
the economy at risk. The Act establishes a Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, and provides for consumer and investor protections. In sum, the Act
provides a strong foundation on which to build a more stable and balanced
regulatory system.
This Essay explains the Dodd-Frank Act, describes the circumstances
from which it grew, and examines its place among wider reform efforts. Part I
discusses the causes of the financial crisis and the need for comprehensive
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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reform. Part II explores the Dodd-Frank Act's central approach. Part III
identifies areas for future reform, both internationally and domestically. A
Conclusion then follows.
I. The Origins of the Financial Crisis
At many turns in history, financial innovations have supported economic
advances; however, without carefully balanced rules governing the financial
sector, these same innovations can also inflict economic damage. One modem
example is securitization-the process of bundling large numbers of individual
assets, such as mortgages or commercial debt, into larger securities.2
Securitization can help to diversify the range of capital sources available to
supply credit in a wide variety of markets, increasing the supply and lowering
the cost of credit. Nonetheless, securitization, without appropriate transparency
and rules, can also widen the gap in incentives facing borrowers, lenders, and
investors, creating the potential for low-quality lending. Similarly, derivative
contracts can permit commercial firms to hedge against interest-rate or
commodity-price risks, enabling them to focus on their core missions, and
credit derivatives can assist financial institutions to provide more capital to
businesses and families by reducing the risk of credit losses. At the same time,
however, derivatives also allow market actors to take positions that magnify
losses, heighten risk concentration in the financial system, and raise the
vulnerability of interconnected financial firms to cascading liquidity and
counterparty credit problems.
Innovations give rise to cycles of regulatory trial and error as market
participants seek to balance benefits and risks appropriately. New products
develop slowly while market participants are unsure of their value or their
risks. As they develop, however, excitement and enthusiasm can overwhelm
normal risk management systems. Participants assume too soon that they really
"know how the products work"; shortly thereafter, the new products are applied
widely without thought to new (and often riskier) contexts, and flood the
market. The cycle turns when this excess and lack of understanding are
exposed. Overall, the economy benefits from this cycle if the downsides to the
broader economy are mitigated through well-designed regulatory safeguards.
The strongest financial markets have regulatory structures that best balance
incentives for innovation and competition, on the one hand, and protections
from abuse and excessive risk taking, on the other.
For many years, the U.S. financial system successfully maintained this
difficult balance. The U.S. financial industry often surpassed its competitors in
93
2. See 1 FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 405
(1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/historyl -16.pdf.
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other major developed economies in innovation and productivity growth.
While housing was highly subsidized, the financial system was generally good
at directing investment toward the companies and industries that offered the
highest returns. Regulatory checks and balances helped create a remarkably
long period of relative economic stability, which, in turn, gave rise to
extraordinary national wealth. Regulation also provided investors and
consumers with strong protections. The system endured crises and recessions,
to be sure, including the costly bank and thrift failures of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, but these shocks did not threaten the foundations of the financial
system.4
Over time, those great strengths were undermined: the system found itself
outgrown and outmaneuvered by the institutions and markets it was responsible
for regulating and constraining, and the carefully designed mix of protections
eroded with the development of new products and markets for which those
protections had not been designed.
The years leading up to the recent crisis saw the growth of large, short-
funded, and substantially interconnected financial firms. Entities performing
the same market functions as banks escaped meaningful regulation on the basis
of their corporate form, and banks were able to move activities, liabilities, and
assets off their balance sheet and outside the reach of more stringent regulation.
The "shadow banking" system allowed financial institutions to engage in
maturity transformation with too little transparency, capital, or oversight.
Derivatives were traded in the shadows with insufficient capital to back the
trades; transactions that were designed to disperse risk instead concentrated it.
"Repo" markets became riskier as collateral shifted from Treasuries to asset-
backed securities.5 The lack of transparency in securitization hid the growing
gap in incentives facing different players in the system and muted the
accountability of those who made loans, sold loans, or packaged loans into
complex instruments for sale to investors. Synthetic products multiplied risks in
the securitization system.6 These shadow banking markets allowed huge
3. See, e.g., Martin Neil Baily, Competition, Regulation, and Efficiency in Service Industries,
in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 71, 106-08 (Martin Neil Baily &
Peter C. Reiss eds., 1993) (calculating that, in 1989, productivity of the U.S. banking sector considerably
exceeded that of Germany and United Kingdom by measures including credit accounts per employee,
deposit accounts per employee, and payments per employee).
4. See I FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 75-79 (1997), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/3_85.pdf (describing treatment of large bank failures and
exercise of systemic risk authority as "[o]pen [q]uestions" after the savings and loan crisis).
5. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (2011), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf (describing "a short-term repo market increasingly reliant on
highly rated non-agency mortgage-backed securities" after 2005). See generally Gary Gorton & Andrew
Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 103 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at
7-8), available at http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10. 1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016 (explaining repo transactions).
6. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 146 (criticizing synthetic collateralized
debt obligations, or "synthetic CDOs," as "bets" that "magnified overall risk" and "multiplied the effects
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amounts of risk to move outside the more regulated parts of the banking system
to places where it was easier to increase leverage.7
The financial sector, under the guise of innovation, piled risk upon ill-
considered risk. Financial innovations outpaced the capacity of managers,
directors, regulators, rating agencies, and the market as a whole to understand
and respond. Rapid growth in key markets hid misaligned incentives and
underlying risk. Capital buffers were increasingly inadequate throughout the
financial system, as both market participants and regulators failed to account
for new risks appropriately.9 The apparent short-term rewards in new financial
products and rapidly growing markets overwhelmed or blinded private-sector
gatekeepers,'o swamping those parts of the system designed to mitigate risk.
Consumer and investor protections were weakened and households took on
risks that they often did not fully understand and could ill-afford."
Rising prices of homes and other assets helped to feed the financial
system's rapid growthl 2 and to hide the underlying problems in the origination
and securitization of loans.' 3 When home prices peaked and then began to
decline in 2006,14 fault lines were revealed.15 The implosion in housing
of the collapse in subprime [mortgage assets]" (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally id. at
142-46, 144 fig.8.2 (explaining synthetic CDOs).
7. See id. at 32 & fig.2.1 (reporting that "shadow banking" sector grew from nearly zero in
1980 to over $12 trillion in 2007-2008, surpassing the size of the "traditional banking" sector).
8. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 143-55 (2011), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/FinancialCrisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf (detailing decoupling
between risk of originated loans and employee compensation at Washington Mutual).
9. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 33 (describing how investment banks'
less-stringent capital requirements allowed them to take greater risks relative to capital than deposit-
taking banks). For a fuller discussion of capital requirements and leverage ratios before the crisis, see
infra note 30.
10. See STAFF OF S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., supra note 8, at 267-313 (describing
failures of credit rating agencies, including conflicts of interest, inaccurate models, failure to retest
ratings of outstanding securities after model changes, inadequate resources, and failure to consider
extent of mortgage fraud).
11. See, e.g., id. at 104-09 (describing mortgages that "[flew ... fully understood" or "kn[ew]
what happened to [the] loan at the end ofthe fixed interest rate period"); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
supra note 5, at 108-09 (citing testimony of witness, describing "people who got steered or defrauded
into entering option [adjustable rate mortgages] with teaser rates or pick-a-pay loans forcing them to ...
pay loans that they could never pay off").
12. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 5 (describing consumers' regular
borrowing against rising home equity values to consume more, pay off other debts, and speculate).
13. See Is Treasury Using Bailout Funds To Increase Foreclosure Prevention, as Congress
Intended?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Pol'y of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, I10th Cong. 60 (2008) (statement of Michael S. Barr, Professor, University of Michigan Law
School) ("The lack of transparency and oversight, coupled with rising home prices, hid the problems
[caused by securitization and other factors] for some time."); EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME
MORTGAGES 7 (2007) (remarking before the 2008 crisis that "house prices have been rising smartly in
many local markets, permitting many borrowers who may have gotten into trouble on their mortgage to
sell the house, pay the prepayment penalty, and walk away from the whole deal without much loss").
14. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 87 fig.6.2.
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cascaded throughout the financial system and spread from weaker firms to
stronger ones.16 In the fall of 2008, credit markets froze.' 7 The major U.S.
investment banks disappeared, merged, or fell into the arms of the Federal
Reserve as bank holding companies.18 The major banks were bailed out by the
federal government,' 9 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
put in place guarantees for the entire banking system. 20 Money market mutual
funds faced massive runs and were backstopped as well. 2 1 The Federal Reserve
pumped billions into the economy and grew its balance sheet by more than one-
and-a-half trillion dollars.22 Congress and the new Administration enacted a
stimulus plan to keep the economy from cratering.23
These efforts to stabilize the economy and the financial sector, however,
did not address the failures that had led to the crisis. In order to restore the
market's ability to generate growth without jeopardizing stability, Congress and
the Administration crafted legislation designed to put in place crucial
protections, reimpose market discipline, revive consumer and investor
protections, and ultimately, restore the foundation that allows beneficial cycles
of financial innovation to continue. The Dodd-Frank Act was the government's
historic response to the causes of the economic crisis. In Part II, this Essay
investigates how the Act addresses the major causes of the economic crisis and
forms the foundation for continued innovation and growth.
15. See id. at 214-21 (describing relatively poor performance of subprime loans and loans
against properties in the "sand states" of Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada, on top of market-
wide increases in mortgage delinquencies).
16. See id. at 360-63 (describing how failures at investment banks caused hedge fund
managers and other investors to withdraw funds from well-capitalized investment banks such as Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs).
17. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, J.
ECON. PERSP., winter 2009, at 77, 82-91.
18. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REP. NO. 446-A, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR
STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM, at iv (2008),
available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2008/446-a.pdf
19. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(establishing Troubled Asset Relief Program and temporarily increasing FDIC-insured deposit
amounts).
20. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,244 (Nov. 26, 2008)
(codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pt. 370). See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH
OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 19 (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 12shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-1 12shrg64832.pdf
(explaining components of Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program).
21. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 358-59; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp l 147.aspx.
22. On July 2, 2008, the Federal Reserve had total assets of $0.90 trillion, see Statistical
Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 5 tbl.4 (July 3, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h4l/20080703/h41.pdf; by December 29, 2010, this total had
increased to $2.42 trillion, see Statistical Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 7 tbl.9
(Dec. 30, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h4l/20101230/h4l.pdf
23. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
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II. The Major Reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act
This Part highlights four key areas of reform found in the Dodd-Frank
Act: (1) regulatory reforms aimed at improving the management of systemic
risk; (2) a new federal resolution authority designed to enable the winding
down of systemically important firms; (3) a framework for regulating
previously under-regulated components of "shadow banking" markets,
including derivatives and "repos"; and (4) a new consumer financial protection
agency. Together, these reforms comprehensively address the regulatory
weaknesses that allowed the unregulated expansion of shadow banking and too-
big-to-fail firms, and they lay a foundation for growth, economic recovery, and
a strong financial system.
A. Improved Management ofSystemic Risk
1. Regulation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
The federal financial regulatory system that existed prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act developed in the context of the banking system of the 1930s and
contained deep structural fissures that by 2008 had allowed systemic risk to
build among less-regulated institutions and markets. Before Dodd-Frank, major
financial firms were regulated according to their formal labels-as banks,
thrifts, investment banks, insurance companies, and the like-rather than
24
according to what they actually did. For example, an entity that called itself a
"bank" faced tougher regulation, more stringent capital requirements, and more
robust supervision than one that called itself an "investment bank."" As a
result, entities such as investment banks, diversified financial institutions, and
nonbank financial companies competed with banks in the mortgage, consumer
credit, and business lending markets, yet escaped the capital and other
requirements imposed on their bank-chartered competitors. Large financial
institutions could choose to be overseen by the regulator that would offer the
least restrictive supervision.
The regulatory system's structural weaknesses led to ineffective
supervision. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) allowed thrifts to engage
24. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS To MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 5-15 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf
(describing evolution ofU.S. financial regulatory system and its divisions by financial activity).
25. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3902, 3907 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (extending capital requirements
imposed by Federal Reserve to bank holding companies only); MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40249, WHo REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION 19-22 (2009) (describing various differences in regulatory treatment between banking and
nonbanking regulators).
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in risky lending 2 6 and, as a result of legal and organizational constraints, was
prevented from effectively supervising diversified savings-and-loan holding
companies, such as AIG.27 The SEC's voluntary Consolidated Supervised
Entity program was a core failing. Designed to allow U.S. investment banks to
satisfy the European Union's home-state regulatory requirements, the program
imposed little actual oversight.28 The SEC was not established as a prudential
regulator, had little experience and few trained examiners, 2 9 and permitted
participating investment banks to sidestep bank leverage limits that were
designed to serve as a backstop for risk-based capital requirements. 3 0
Today, the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to supervise
and regulate any financial firm, regardless of legal form, whose failure could
pose a threat to financial stability. The OTS has been abolished, 3 ' along with
the SEC's voluntary investment bank regulatory scheme. 3 2 In addition to its
26. See STAFF OF S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., supra note 8, at 208-39 (detailing failure
of OTS to supervise lending practices effectively at several large thrifts that later failed).
27. The OTS's supervisory efforts focused not on threats to savings-and-loan holding
companies, but rather on the safety and soundness of the underlying thrift institutions. See TARP and
Other Government Assistance for AIG: Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 62
(2010) (statement of Michael E. Finn, Northeast Regional Director, Office of Thrift Supervision). To the
extent that the OTS did investigate derivative risk at AIG, it did not perceive that risk's potential to
create liquidity problems in the event of a credit rating downgrade. See American International Group:
Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 50 (2009) (statement of
Scott M. Polakoff, Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision) (acknowledging OTS's "failure to
recognize in time the extent of the liquidity risk to AIG of the 'super senior' credit default swaps in
[AIG's] portfolio").
28. For a comprehensive analysis of the history and failures of the Consolidated Supervised
Entity program, see SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 18.
29. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 151 (describing Consolidated
Supervised Entity program as "the SEC's first foray into supervising firms for safety and soundness").
30. Rules promulgated by federal banking regulators capped leverage ratios for most banks at
four percent, or 25:1. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(c) (2011) (requirement for nationally chartered banks); id. pt.
208 app. B (requirement for state-chartered banks that are members of Federal Reserve System); id. pt.
225 app. D (requirement for bank holding companies); id. § 325.3 (requirement for FDIC-supervised
banks); id. §§ 567.2(a)(2), 567.8 (requirement for thrifts). Banks suffering from "supervisory, financial,
operational, or managerial weaknesses" or "anticipating or experiencing significant growth" were
expected to "maintain capital levels well above the minimum levels," id. pt. 208, app. B sec. II.a, and
from 2000 to 2007, most large banks and thrifts had leverage ratios between 16:1 and 22:1, see FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 65. However, in 2004, the SEC created an exemption from its
broker-dealer net capital rule for "very highly capitalized firms that have developed robust internal risk
management practices." Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 240). By 2007-2008, major investment banks maintained leverage ratios well above those of
large banks: Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley each had a ratio greater than 30:1.
SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 18, at 120 fig. 1.
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413).
32. Id. § 617, 124 Stat. at 1616 (repealing former 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i)); see Press Release, SEC,
Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm. Investment-bank holding companies may now
register with the Federal Reserve Board to satisfy foreign supervision requirements. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1850a(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
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precrisis role regulating bank holding companies,33 the Federal Reserve will
oversee savings-and-loan holding companies in place of the OTS 34 and will
also supervise nonbank financial institutions identified by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council as posing a risk to financial stability.35
The Dodd-Frank Act's response to the failure of the prior regulatory
regime to account for the systemic importance of certain large institutions goes
beyond the Federal Reserve's new oversight role. The new legislation requires
large banks and systemically important nonbank firms to meet stricter capital
and liquidity requirements than their smaller peers. The Fed is charged with
putting these requirements into place3 6 and with conducting annual stress tests
to determine whether these firms retain enough capital to withstand adverse
economic conditions.3 7 The Act specifically instructs the Fed to use
macroprudential supervision, which takes into account not only risks within the
institution but also the risks that the institution poses to the financial system as
a whole.3 8 Major firms (including bank holding companies, savings-and-loan
holding companies, insured depository institutions, and systemically important
nonbank firms) will be subject to new concentration limits, which will prohibit
mergers or acquisitions that would result in one firm's liabilities exceeding 10
percent of the liabilities of financial companies as a whole. 39 Moreover, all
firms will be subject to lending limits4 0 and to enhanced rules on affiliate
transactionS41 and counterparty credit exposures.42 These enhanced prudential
measures for major financial firms are likely to reduce risk in the financial
system and reduce any "too-big-to-fail" distortions.4 3
2. Systemic Risk Monitoring
U.S. financial markets have suffered for the lack of an effective system for
monitoring and responding to systemic threats to financial stability as they
arise. Before Dodd-Frank, no regulator or supervisor had the authority to look
across the full sweep of the financial system-including less-regulated
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
34. Id. §§ 5412(b)(1), 5413 (Supp. IV 2010).
35. Id. § 5323; see infra Subsection I.A.2.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a).
37. Id. § 5365(i).
38. Id. §§ 5323(a)-(b), 5370(b).
39. Id. § 1852. These limits include wholesale funding and off-balance sheet exposures. Id.
40. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 610, 124 Stat. 1376, 1611-12 (2010) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 84(b)).
41. See id. §§ 608(a)-(b), 609, 124 Stat. at 1608-11 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1).
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(e)(3)(E) (Supp. IV 2010).
43. While the credit rating agencies continue to provide an "uptick" for perceived government
support to major financial firms, at least one of the agencies has indicated that it is likely to revisit this
question once the Act's reforms and Basel capital rules are fully in place. See Press Release, Moody's
Investor Serv., Moody's Reviews BofA, Citi, Wells Fargo Supported Ratings for Downgrade (June 2,
2011), available at http://www.moodys.com/printresearchdoctopdf.aspx?docid=PR_219798.
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segments-and take action when it perceived a threat.44 In fact, regulators and
market participants did not even have enough data to understand how
interconnected the market was, or how heavily it relied on short-term funding.4 5
While the Dodd-Frank Act was unable to consolidate the panoply of
regulators in the United States into a single body, it did establish a Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which has the authority to identify and address
threats to financial stability. 4 6 The Council will have access to information from
across the financial services marketplace, including information collected by
the new Office of Financial Research under standards the Office will develop
and enforce.47
B. Orderly Liquidation Authority
The Dodd-Frank Act's second key innovation is the establishment of
authority for liquidating large, interconnected nonbank financial institutions
similar to the ones whose collapse fueled the last economic crisis. This
authority will prove transformative not only during future crises, but also
during quieter times, by reducing the perception that large firms are "too big to
fail." The perception that some firms were "too big to fail" distorted the market
in the years before the crisis by reducing market discipline, encouraging
excessive risk taking, artificially sustaining the growth of larger firms, and
creating an "unlevel playing field with smaller firms."" The resolution
authority should help to reduce these distortions by giving the government a
credible tool to wind down large, highly leveraged, and substantially
interconnected financial firms. Moreover, resolution authority should prove
useful in helping the government manage a financial crisis itself.
44. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 22-30.
45. See Equipping Financial Regulators with the Tools Necessary To Monitor Systemic Risk:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Int'I Trade & Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, I1 lth Cong. 38 (2010) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2010); H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 865 (2010) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 722-23.
47. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5341-5346 (creating an Office of Financial Research within the U.S.
Department of the Treasury). Congress created the office to "provide objective, unbiased assessments of
the risks facing the financial system." S. REP. No. 111-176, at 4 (2010).
48. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address to the
Council on Foreign Relations: Financial Reform To Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200903 10a.htm; see also Too Big To Fail or
Too Big To Save?: Examining the Systemic Threats of Large Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., Illth Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia
University) (discussing economic distortions); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 20, at 2-3. Firms
perceived as "too big to fail" also enjoyed higher profitability through reduced borrowing costs. See S.
REP. NO. 111-176, at 5 (2010) (noting testimony of FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair that, "large financial
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During the 2007-2008 crisis, federal regulators, including the FDIC, used
Depression-era bank resolution laws to manage several significant bank and
thrift failures while minimizing macroeconomic disruption. 4 9 When nonbank
firms such as Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and AIG faced similar problems,
though, the government was forced to choose between launching extraordinary
bailouts and leaving the firms to seek protection in bankruptcy.50 The
Bankruptcy Code, however, is not intended to handle systemic risk; rather, its
narrower purpose is to ensure the "equitable distribution of [a] bankrupt's
estate among [its] creditors." 1 This narrower focus, court decision-making
processes, and the lack of a pre-positioned funding mechanism for liquidity,
make bankruptcy a poor choice for resolving major financial firms-as became
abundantly clear with the bankruptcy of Lehman.
To remedy this situation, the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the government
to use the same approach it has long taken for bank failures to resolve the
largest and most interconnected financial companies outside of the traditional
bankruptcy regime. Receivership under this new orderly liquidation authority
will hold three essential advantages over the tools that were available in the fall
of 2008. First, the FDIC will be required to ensure that shareholders do not
receive payment from a failed firm's liquidation until all other claims are paid5 2
and that culpable board members and managers are replaced. Forcing
managers, shareholders, and other parties to absorb losses in this way will
reduce the moral hazard associated with the "too-big-to-fail" problem. Second,
the FDIC will be permitted to relieve liquidity stress and to avoid the cascades
of defaults that lead to system-wide collapse by temporarily staying
counterparty termination and netting rights54 and by borrowing funds from the
Treasury to fund qualified financial contracts and other short-term debt. Any
such Treasury loan would be automatically repaid from the assets of the failed
firm,55 or, if these are insufficient, from an ex post assessment on the largest
49. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OIG-09-032, SAFETY
AND SOUNDNESS: MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF INDYMAC BANK, FSB, at 62 (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/oig09032.pdf (describing closure
of IndyMac Bank by OTS on Friday and reopening under FDIC control on following Monday); OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDIC, REP. No. EVAL-
10-002, EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 13
(2010), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reportslO/10-002EV.pdf (describing sale of Washington
Mutual Bank to JPMorgan Chase by the FDIC contemporaneously with its closure by OTS).
50. See Too Big To Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation
Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 (2009) [hereinafter Too Big To Fail Hearing] (statement of Michael S. Barr,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, United States Department of the Treasury). See generally
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 280-91 (describing Bear Steams sale); id. at 324-43
(describing Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing); id. at 344-52 (describing AIG bailout).
51. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 5386(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
53. Id. § 5386(4)-(5).
54. Id. § 5390(c)(10)(B).
55. Id. § 5390(n).
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financial firms5 -not by taxpayers. Third, the FDIC will be empowered to
create a bridge company to satisfy the distressed firm's liquidity and capital
needs until the firm's liquidation, recapitalization, or sale.s? Such an
arrangement would allow the FDIC receivers to fund derivative and repo
contracts, handle counterparty claims, mitigate any "knock-on" effects of
multiple firm failures, and preserve the distressed company's stronger
subsidiaries. In this way, shareholders and creditors will bear losses without
exposing the system to a sudden, disorderly failure that would put the entire
system at risk.
The Act's liquidation authority also contains important creditor
protections, including opportunities for judicial review at two different stages:
first, when the Secretary of the Treasury invokes the government's orderly
liquidation authority, 5 9 and second, in the course of the resolution process.
The latter form of judicial review is modeled on the system of judicial review
that has policed the FDIC's receivership and conservatorship authorities for
more than seventy-five years. The Act also allows a claimant to challenge a
decision by the regulator disallowing its claim.62 Finally, like the Bankruptcy
Code, the new authority is based on fundamental principles of fairness and
equity among similarly situated stakeholders and requires that any deviation
from these principles leave all stakeholders in no worse a position than they
would have been in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 6 3
While liquidations under the Dodd-Frank Act's authority are designed to
be orderly, they are also intended to be rare.64 As explained above, the Act
requires major financial firms to meet heightened prudential standards,
including higher capital requirements, which will reduce the likelihood of
failure and provide a bigger capital buffer to cushion losses.65 Firms will also
be required to develop detailed plans, colloquially referred to as "living wills,"
for their orderly resolution; these plans will simplify organizational forms,
improve supervision, and help firms prepare for financial crises. The Act also
encourages firms to reduce their size, complexity, leverage, and
interconnections, and subjects those firms that remain systemically important to
56. Id. § 5390(o).
57. See id. § 5390(h).
58. Too Big To Fail Hearing, supra note 50, at 21-22.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
60. Too Big To Fail Hearing, supra note 50, at 24.
61. Id.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(4).
63. See id. § 5390(a)(7)(B).
64. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 4 (2010) ("There is a strong presumption that the bankruptcy
process will continue to be used to close and unwind failing financial companies, including large,
complex ones.").
65. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d). For an explanation of financial "living wills," see KENNETH R.
FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANcIAL SYSTEM 100-06 (2011).
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increased comprehensive oversight, larger capital buffers,67 and stringent
conditions on the use of short-term debt or "hot" money funding. But it is
important to be humble about the efficacy of any regulatory plan and about our
ability to predict every systemic failure of a major financial firm. In a severe
crisis, major firms may fail, and prudential measures and capital buffers may
prove insufficient for bankruptcy to be an option. In that case, the Dodd-Frank
Act's orderly liquidation authority, and the concomitant liquidity funding it
provides, will reduce the risk that any single firm's failure will endanger the
nation's broader financial stability.
Still, the creation of this domestic resolution authority is only a starting
point. Large financial institutions operate globally, and resolving a major firm
will require international cooperation and coordination. Addressing this
dimension of the systemic risk problem will require other nations to develop
and implement resolution authorities and the United States to build on the
international "college" model used to supervise the largest financial firms.6 9
C Oversight of Under-Regulated Financial Markets
As discussed above, the rise of the shadow banking system allowed
financial firms to take on additional risk without adequate safeguards. When
this system failed, regulators and market participants lacked reliable data on the
extent of the liquidity and solvency risks faced by these financial firms, which
made it difficult for regulators to craft appropriate responses. All of these
factors contributed to a market-wide panic. The Dodd-Frank Act addresses
these problems by introducing transparency requirements and effective,
consolidated supervision over the most important shadow banking
instruments-over-the-counter derivatives, repurchase ("repo") agreements,
and securitized assets.
1. Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are derivative contracts that are
bought and sold outside of regulated exchanges such as the Chicago Board of
Trade.o In the years before the economic crisis, the market in these financial
products reached a notional amount of nearly $700 trillion.71 In hindsight, we
know that this market was responsible for a significant increase in both risk and
uncertainty in the broader financial market. Credit derivatives, which were
designed to diffuse risk, instead concentrated it among large banks, investment
67. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365(a)-(c), 5371(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
68. Id. § 5365(g).
69. For a discussion of priorities for international collaboration, see infra Section III.B.
70. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 45-46.
71. Id. at 299.
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banks, and other institutions, such as AIG.72 Derivatives increased firms'
counterparty credit exposures and aggravated the effect of any particular
firm's failure on the financial system as a whole. Synthetic securitization (with
embedded derivatives) magnified failures in the real securitization market.74
Prior to the crisis, these risks were concealed by the lack of regulatory or
public disclosure in the OTC derivatives market. Information on the prices and
volume of trades was opaque to external parties. 75 Moreover, traders were
backed by insufficient margin, and major participants in the system lacked
sufficient capital in the event that these trades lost value or went bad. In
addition, many of the trades were funded with short-term money that quickly
disappeared when the crisis hit. The lack of information on derivative
exposures led firms to withdraw from counterparties and broad market sectors
as the crisis unfolded. Firms demanded more margin protection from their
remaining counterparties, which put further downward pressure on underlying
asset prices. While individual firms had hoped that their use of derivatives
would help them to manage risk, the system as a whole became riskier. In the
crisis, the implosion in asset prices led to cascading losses in derivatives
contracts and then to contagion across the system.
Today, regulators are putting in place the tools to regulate the OTC
derivatives market. The Dodd-Frank Act reduces risk concentration and market
opacity by promoting central clearing and exchange trading, and by
strengthening supervision of market participants. Central clearing is
encouraged by a combination of requirements and incentives. Standardized
derivatives must be centrally cleared and traded either on designated exchanges
or through swap execution facilities. 76 All other derivatives are subjected to
new reporting requirements77 and higher capital and margin requirements,
which will encourage greater standardization and use of central clearing. 8
These measures are also expected to reduce costs by improving price
transparency and competition and to reduce risks by preventing the unnoticed
buildup of counterparty risks. 7 9 At the same time, supervision will be increased
through prudential regulation of and capital requirements on dealers and other
major players in the OTC derivatives markets.80  Derivative clearing
72. See id. at 50.
73. See id. at 299-30 1.
74. See id. at 146.
75. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 30 (2010).
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-81 (2010) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2).
77. Id. § 729, 124 Stat. at 1701-02 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6r).
78. Id. § 731, 124 Stat. at 1703-12 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (imposing registration, capital,
and margin requirements).
79. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 32 (2010).
80. See Dodd-Frank Act § 729, 124 Stat. at 1703-12 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s).
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organizations, which will assume counterparty risk for centrally cleared trades,
will be regulated for capital, margin, conflicts, ownership, and other matters.8'
2. "Repo" and Other Markets
As it reforms derivatives markets, the Dodd-Frank Act also provides a
new framework for regulating other financial market instruments, including the
repurchase agreements, or "repos," that are critical to the shadow banking
system. In the lead-up to the financial crisis, major financial firms increasingly
looked to the repo markets for short-term funding.82 At the same time, these
markets were growing riskier, due to market concentration in the two major
clearing banks83 and a shift away from low-risk Treasury bonds to higher-risk
collateral, ranging from equities and corporate debt to asset-backed securities. 84
Market participants misjudged the quality and liquidity of these newer forms of
collateral, in part because of credit rating agencies' increasing willingness to
label as "safe" assets backed by lower-quality loans-particularly poorly
underwritten subprime and Alt-A mortgages.85 When the financial crisis hit, the
repo markets froze, causing a massive contraction in available credit.8 ' This
contraction was stemmed only by a massive Fed intervention.87
The Dodd-Frank Act will fundamentally reform the short-term wholesale
funding markets by forcing firms to internalize more of the costs of this
funding system. The Act empowers the Federal Reserve to regulate financial
market utilities (FMUs) identified by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
as systemically important,88 to set new rules for capital, collateral, and margin
requirements, 8 and to establish uniform risk-management standards to be used
across the market. 90 Regulation of FMUs will formalize and strengthen the
81. See id. § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1687-92 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)).
82. See Brunnermeier, supra note 17, at 80 (noting that investment banks nearly doubled repo
funding, measured as percentage of total assets, between 2000 and 2007).
83. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 283-84 (describing the concentration of
tri-party repo market).
84. See id. at 114.
85. See STAFF OF S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., supra note 8, at 243-46 (describing
"inaccurate credit ratings issued by Moody's and S&P").
86. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4-5 & fig.4) (describing "run on repo"
as an increase in haircuts on collateral, and showing that the average haircut increased dramatically over
2007-2008).
87. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 20, at 16-17 (describing the Fed's programs to
improve liquidity in asset-backed-securities markets).
88. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5461-5472 (Supp. IV 2010) (empowering the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to designate systemically important "financial market utilities" and "payment,
clearing, or settlement activities," and authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe standards
governing these utilities and activities).
89. Id. § 5464(c).
90. See id. § 5461(b); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 869-70 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 726-27. Other federal financial regulators must consult the Federal Reserve
Board when reviewing operational changes proposed by financial market utilities, see 12 U.S.C. §
5465(e); during examinations, see id. §§ 5466, 5467; and during the rule-making process, see id. §§
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Fed's oversight of key clearing and settlement functions, including oversight of
the two clearing banks for the tri-party repo market. The Fed is already moving
to strengthen the tri-party repo system by shortening (or eliminating) the
"unwind" period during which these firms provide intraday credit. Other
reforms are also integral to reforming these markets. For example, major
financial firms will face stringent liquidity requirements under Basel III.9 1 In
addition, these firms will face limitations under the Dodd-Frank Act on short-
term debt and on counterparty credit exposures. 92 Moreover, reforms to deposit
insurance assessments will encompass all liabilities, not simply deposits.93
Money market funds, which are important buyers of short-term commercial
debt, will maintain stronger liquidity positions through improved SEC
regulations on portfolio quality, average portfolio maturity, and convertibility
to cash.94 These reforms will have the effect of taxing or regulating short-term
borrowing and thus encouraging firms to move to a more sustainable funding
structure.
3. Securitization
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act fundamentally transforms regulation of the
last major element of the shadow banking system: securitization. The Act
requires investment banks and other issuers to provide comprehensive
disclosure of securitization structures, including information about assets and
originators.95 Sponsors will also be required under most circumstances to retain
a portion of the risk in the securitizations they sponsor, 96 so that incentives are
better aligned among participants in the system. Capital rules will better
5471, 5472. The Federal Reserve Board may also recommend that other federal financial regulators take
enforcement actions against financial market utilities they supervise, see id. § 5466(e), and may itself
take emergency enforcement actions with the approval of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, see
id. §§ 5466(f), 5467(e).
91. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III:
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING
(2010) [hereinafter BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl88.pdf; BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION (2008), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl44.pdf
92. See Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1427-28 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(e)).
93. See id. § 331(b), 124 Stat. at 1538 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817).
94. See Money Market Fund Reform, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). See generally PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN.
MARKETS, MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM OPTIONS 13-16 (2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/10.21%20PWG%20Report%2OFinal.pdf (reviewing SEC's progress in regulating
money market funds).
95. Dodd-Frank Act § 942, 124 Stat. at 1896-97 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(g), 780(d)).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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account for actual risk,9 7 while parallel changes in accounting rules will bring
the most common forms of securitizations onto the balance sheet.9 8 Credit
rating agencies, whose ratings for securitizations contributed significantly to
market distortions, 9 9 will be subject to comprehensive oversight by the SEC,
including policing of ratings shopping and conflicts of interest.100 Ratings will
also be more transparent, thanks to mandatory disclosure of information on
rating methodologies, underlying data, and results of third-party due
diligence.101
D. A Market- Wide Regulator for Consumer Protection
Before Dodd-Frank, federal financial consumer protection regulation was
fragmented over seven different agencies, which complicated rule-writing,
supervision, and enforcement efforts.10 2 This fragmentation also allowed banks
to choose the least restrictive consumer protection rules available 03 and
nonbank financial institutions to avoid federal supervision altogether.104
Federal agencies, concerned mostly with the safety and soundness of the
institutions within their purview, did not focus on protecting consumers'05 and
preempted state consumer protection laws without adequately replacing these
important safeguards. 0 6
The Dodd-Frank Act replaces this fragmented, inefficient system with a
single, dedicated regulatory agency. Armed with expanded authority to prohibit
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices,' 0 7 and with a congressional mission
"to ensure that . . . consumer protection laws and regulations are
97. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines and Other Related Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 4636 (Jan. 28,
2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567).
98. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCOUNTING SER. NO. 310, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166 (2009); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN.
ACCOUNTING SER. NO. 311, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 167 (2009).
99. See STAFF OF S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIG., supra note 8, at 243-46; S. REP. NO.
I 11-176, at 36 (2010).
100. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1872-83 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 780-7).
101. Id. § 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. at 1877-78.
102. See Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone ofAmerica 's New
Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong.
6-7 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Financial Protection Hearing] (statement of Michael S. Barr,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, United States Department of the Treasury).
103. See id.; see also id. at 60-63; S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 168 ("The result [of divided
regulatory authority] has been that banks could choose the least restrictive consumer compliance
supervisor."); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 55.
104. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 23-27.
105. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 10 (describing competing demands of consumer protection
and safety-and-soundness supervision).
106. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 111-13.
107. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005-06 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
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comprehensive, fair, and vigorously enforced,"108 the newly established
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will end regulatory shopping and
increase government accountability.109 The consolidation of enforcement and
rule-making authorities in the Bureau will also improve feedback in the rule-
making process, as well as general regulatory quality. 0 The Bureau will be
charged with balancing consumer protection, financial access, and
innovation,"' and with collaborating more closely with state attorneys
general.'1 2 Finally, the Bureau will be expected to serve as an innovator in its
own right, introducing more efficient supervisory methods for nonbank firms,
such as risk-based examinations," 3 and incorporating into its rule-making
approach insights on consumer decision-making derived from behavioral
economics.1 14 This new generation of consumer protection regulation will not
only promote competition among banks and nonbank institutions on the basis
of price and quality, but also will empower consumers to make their own
choices and find the most suitable financial products, even when providers have
incentives to hide true costs.
III. Beyond Dodd-Frank: Future Areas for Reform
The Dodd-Frank Act is a historic step toward correcting the weaknesses
of the U.S. financial regulatory system, and its passage will help make financial
markets fairer and more stable. Many significant steps still need to be taken,
however. In the United States, immediate priorities include further
consolidating the nation's financial regulators, shoring up money market funds,
and reforming the troubled government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. At the same time, on the international stage, central bankers and
regulators around the world must work together to regulate the world's largest
financial institutions.
108. H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
730.
109. Consumer Financial Protection Hearing, supra note 102, at 63; see also H.R. REP. No.
111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730 ("The Bureau will have
authority to issue rules applicable to all financial institutions . . . .").
110. See Consumer Financial Protection Hearing, supra note 102, at 64.
Ill. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
112. See id. §§ 5495, 5552.
113. Consumer Financial Protection Hearing, supra note 102, at 64.
114. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5532(b)(3), (c), (e) (mandating use of consumer testing in
developing effective consumer disclosure, including consideration of "available evidence about
consumer awareness, understanding of, and responses to disclosures or communications"). See generally
Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
REGULATION 25 (David A. Moss & John A. Cisternino eds., 2009), available at
http://www.tobinproject.org/twobooks/pdf/New Perspectives Full Text.pdf (describing how insights
from behavioral economics may be incorporated into the design of regulation).
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A. Further Areas ofDomestic Reform
The Dodd-Frank Act is a comprehensive response to the regulatory gaps
and weaknesses that led to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. But the Act is not
perfect. Going forward, reform efforts should focus on addressing the
organizational fragmentation of federal regulators, the risks facing money
market mutual funds, and the troubled state of government-sponsored housing
finance entities.
1. Consolidation of Financial Regulators
The Dodd-Frank Act took several key steps toward reorganizing the U.S.
federal regulatory system and reducing regulatory arbitrage by creating the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Office of Financial Research
(OFR), and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC); abolishing the
OTS;'15 consolidating holding company oversight authority in the Fed;"16
requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) to cooperate in rule-making
on derivatives;'17 and eliminating a number of spurious distinctions between
bank and thrift charters." 8 Yet bureaucratic and congressional turf disputes
made further consolidation unattainable. Conceptually, much more could have
been done to close gaps and relieve tensions arising from fragmentation. While
the Dodd-Frank Act requires extensive joint rule-making on derivatives, the
split between the SEC and the CFTC has created "gaps and inconsistencies" in
futures, derivatives, and securities regulations in the past.119 Consolidating
these two commissions into a single business conduct regulator would promote
further harmonization of regulatory policy and enforcement. Similarly, while
the Dodd-Frank Act abolished the OTS,120 it maintains the thrift charter and
continues the split among the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and the FDIC for federal supervision of banks and thriftS12 1 _
a relic of the ad hoc evolution of the U.S. financial regulatory system. Further
consolidation of banking safety-and-soundness regulators would do more to
end regulator shopping and achieve more efficient and consistent regulation. As
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 5413.
116. See id § 5361 (nonbank financial companies); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 604, 124 Stat. 1376, 1599-1604 (2010)
(amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (thrift holding companies).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (Supp. IV 2010).
118. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 613, 124 Stat. at 1614 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g)(1)(A),
1828(d)(4)(A)(i)) (harmonizing regulations for de novo branching into states).
119. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 7
(2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport web.pdf.
120. See Dodd-Frank Act § 313, 124 Stat. at 1523 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413).
121. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 866 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N.
722, 723 (describing distribution of regulatory responsibilities formerly residing in OTC among OCC,
FDIC, and Federal Reserve Board).
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regulators and Congress become used to the patterns of cooperative regulation
and supervision required by the Dodd-Frank Act, fostered by participation in
the FSOC and engagement with the Office of Financial Research, it is possible
that further regulatory consolidation may become more politically plausible.122
2. Money Market Funds
Further regulation of the shadow banking system must include regulation
designed to lower the susceptibility of money market funds (MMFs) to runs by
investors. MMFs' redemption-on-demand rules and stable net asset values
(NAVs) led many individual and institutional investors to view them as cash-
like, near-substitutes for bank deposits.' 2 3 But repo funding from MMFs dried
up quickly in the crisis, 12 4 and after the failure of Lehman Brothers, large losses
at some MMFs led to massive redemptions. One large MMF "broke the buck"
by failing to maintain its ability to redeem shares at full value, and a massive
run on MMFs ensued. 12 5 This crisis-within-the-crisis led the government to
guarantee MMFs.12 6
Since the crisis, the SEC, which regulates MMFs,12 7 has promulgated rule
changes intended to make MMFs more resilient to short-term market risks.128
These changes alone, however, are unlikely to prevent a run on MMFs like the
one that took place after the Lehman bankruptcy.129 A more comprehensive
reform package might include some of the following elements: a switch to
floating net asset values for some or all investors to increase risk
transparency;13 0 more stringent regulations and capital requirements for stable
NAV funds or their sponsors;' 31 triggers for delivery of redemptions-in-kind to
relieve liquidity pressure during market disruptions;132 an explicit insurance
122. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Reform in the Real World: Introductory Note 10-11
(June 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/SeminarPapers/2009-
201 O/Introduction%20to%2ORegulatory/o20Reform%20in%20the%20Real%2World%20Presentation
%20for/o2oWharton%2oSeminar.pdf (positing that consolidation of FSOC, OFR, OCC, and OTS within
Department of the Treasury may allow for creation of "proto-consolidated regulatory agency"). For
more suggestions along these lines, see Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased
Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 09-19, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1300431.
123. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 94, at 8.
124. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at 358 (describing MMFs' abandonment
of commercial paper markets).
125. See id. at 357-59.
126. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 21.
127. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2011) (prescribing standards for maturity, quality, and
diversification of MMF portfolios, and for share valuation).
128. See Money Market Fund Reform, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
129. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 119, at 38.
130. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 94, at 19-23, 29-32.
131. See id. at 32-35.
132. See id. at 25-26.
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scheme; 33 and a private-sector liquidity backstop. 13 4 Recently, the SEC has
focused on establishing capital rules for stable NAV funds or moving to a
floating NAV system.'35 Unless further reforms are adopted, money market
funds will continue to be a potential source of run risk and instability in the
system.13 6
3. Government-Sponsored Entities
For decades, the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae")
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac")-
nominally private institutions, but perceived to carry U.S. government
guarantees against default' 3 7-helped facilitate housing finance by purchasing
or guaranteeing qualifying loans.'3 These shareholder-owned entities enjoyed
an implicit government backstop for which they did not pay, along with weak
oversight and excessively low capital requirements. Over time, moreover, these
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) strayed from their core mission. To stem
the loss of their market share to the private securitization market, they took on
excessive risk, purchased or guaranteed subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans,
and made investments in the ostensibly AAA-rated tranches of subprime and
Alt-A mortgage-backed securities. Critically, by the onset of the financial
crisis, Fannie and Freddie had reached dangerously high leverage levels, which
were permitted under preferential capital requirements.139 Furthermore,
excessive risk-taking was masked by questionable accounting practices.14 0
After the housing market started to collapse, the GSEs came under
extreme market pressure,141 and, in 2008, Congress passed legislation to
authorize the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to place the firms
under conservatorship or receivership.142 Although the nation must still deal
with the poor decisions made by these entities prior to conservatorship, the
FHFA has acted vigorously to improve the quality of their new assets and
bolster their profitability. Losses from new loans have fallen off
133. See id. at 26-28.
134. See id. at 23-25.
135. See Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association 2011 Annual Meeting (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2011/spch l10711mls.htm.
136. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011 .pdf.
137. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 5, at xxvi.
138. See generally id. at 38-42 (tracing precrisis history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
139. Id. at 39; see also id. at xx ("The kings of leverage were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
[B]y the end of 2007, Fannie's and Freddie's combined leverage ratio, including loans they owned
and guaranteed, stood at 75 to 1.").
140. Id. at 314.
141. Id. at 316.
142. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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precipitously,143 while guarantee fees have increased, average credit scores
have improved, and high-risk Alt-A loans have been excised from the GSEs'
new book of business. 144 The GSEs' performance in conservatorship has helped
prevent more severe problems in the housing market by providing credit at a
time when private capital has been scarce. 145 These entities continue to enable
millions to take out a mortgage or refinance a home.146
While the GSEs and the FHFA are playing essential roles in keeping
mortgage finance flowing following the massive disruption to the financial
system, this outsized government role needs to be reduced over time.147
Policymakers must decide whether, and to what extent, the government should
continue to issue housing guarantees, beyond those mortgages that are insured
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).1 48 History suggests that in the
event of another sufficiently large crisis in the housing market, the government
will intervene once again, in order to protect the larger financial sector and the
wealth of individual households. Any housing finance system must
acknowledge that fact and provide a realistic mechanism for responding
without excessive risk to taxpayers.
These considerations point in the direction of up-front fees for
government guarantees. If guarantees are to be provided, they must be explicit
and appropriately priced, so that private sector gains do not come at the
expense of public sector losses.149 In the ideal world, private shareholder-
143. See The Future of Housing Finance: A Progress Update on the GSEs: Hearing Before
'the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., I 11th
Cong. 12 (2010) [hereinafter Future of Housing Finance Hearing] (statement of Michael S. Barr,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, United States Department of the Treasury) (noting that as
of September 2010, only one percent of Fannie's and Freddie's credit losses came from loans originated
in 2009-2010).
144. Id. at 50.
145. See id. (stating that, as of September 2010, GSEs and Government National Mortgage
Association collectively financed roughly ninety-five percent of originated mortgages); cf Housing
Finance: What Should the New System Be Able To Do?: Part I: Government and Stakeholder
Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Illth Cong. 136 (2010) [hereinafter
Government and Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing] (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary,
United States Department of the Treasury) (stating that GSE conservatorship prevented "a much more
wrenching decline in housing prices, a more severe foreclosure crisis and a deeper economic
downturn").
146. See Future of Housing Finance Hearing, supra note 143, at 50.
147. See Michael S. Barr, Professor, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Keynote Presentation Before
the New York University Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy Roundtable: A Framework for
Housing Finance Reform 10 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://firmancenter.org/files/MichaelBarrNavigatingUncertainWaterSpeech.pdf.
148. See id. at 8, 10; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 24-30 (2011),
available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforning%20America%27s%20Housing%20Finance%
20Market.pdf (describing policy considerations surrounding continuing government role in housing
finance and presenting to Congress three long-term options, ranging from "[a] government insurance
role limited to . .. assistance for narrowly targeted groups of borrowers" to "[federal] assistance for low-
and moderate-income borrowers and catastrophic reinsurance behind significant private capital").
149. See Future of Housing Finance Hearing, supra note 143, at 53.
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owned entities would not issue mortgages or securities with government
guarantees because the inherent conflict between shareholder interests and the
public interest is too strong. Alternative ownership structures, such as
cooperatives or a government corporation, would work better at reducing that
conflict. Moreover, any guarantee should run to the mortgage product, not the
institution, and should be explicit and paid for in advance. A government
guarantee appears to be required to maintain the availability of the thirty-year
fixed-rate mortgage-a singular product of the post-Depression reforms that
relieves households of the need to self-insure against interest-rate risk-as an
option for most middle-income borrowers. A housing finance system without
such a product available for most borrowers would be a radical departure from
our current system. Moreover, in the event of a housing crisis, the presence of a
prepaid guarantee would permit the government to serve as a lender of last
resort and to insure against catastrophic loss and instability. Lastly, without a
government guarantee, the housing finance system will tend to be concentrated
in the banking sector and, given economies of scale, in the largest financial
institutions.
Regardless of the form that any future government guarantees may take,
the government must also prepare Fannie and Freddie for an orderly
reorganization that will not disrupt the housing market. The GSEs and the
federal government play a greater role in the housing market now than at any
time since the Great Depression,150 and a sudden market exit would undermine
stability and prevent homeowners from obtaining credit. 51 Freddie and Fannie
should reduce their portfolio holdings gradually, and the FHFA must retain the
necessary human capital and infrastructure to ensure a smooth transition.
Conforming loan limits should be allowed to gradually fall as private capital
becomes available to meet demand. 152 Eventually, guarantee fees should be
increased, the FHFA should experiment with bringing in private capital to
absorb first losses on agency mortgage-backed securities, and the government
should foster a diversity of funding sources to reduce the current outsized
reliance on GSEs.153
B. Progress Toward International Reform
While the United States is implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, global
reforms must proceed as well.154 In particular, the United States should
150. Government and Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note 146, at 141.
151. Future of Housing Finance Hearing, supra note 143, at 54.
152. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note
148, at 13; Barr, supra note 147, at 10-11.
153. See Future ofHousing Finance Hearing, supra note 143, at 54-55.
154. See generally INT'L BAR Assoc. TASK FORCE ON THE FIN. CRISIS, A SURVEY OF
CURRENT REGULATORY TRENDS (2010)), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=2c72f588-7222-47c9-83e4-7dbOa0a8bflc
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continue to press for governments to improve the quality and quantity of
required capital; reduce the moral hazard created by systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs); and improve transparency and oversight in the
OTC derivatives market.
1. Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has made much progress in
developing more robust global capital standards.'5 5 Under the Committee's
most recent proposal, known as Basel III,156 minimum capital ratios are set at a
level that will require a significant increase in firms' reserves.'5 7 Other changes
to quantitative capital requirements include new capital conservation buffers
above the minimum levels' 58 and a "SIFI surcharge" for the largest firms,
ranging from 1.0-to-2.5% above the levels required for less systemically
important firms.15 9 The Basel Committee is also productively considering a role
for contingent capital instruments-debt that transforms into equity under
specified circumstances-in forcing firms to internalize the costs of their own
failure, and thus reducing the likelihood of government intervention.'60
The Basel III standards not only increase the amount of regulatory capital,
but also improve its quality, or loss absorbency. The new capital requirements
will focus on common equity,' 6 1 excluding other assets that did little to absorb
(describing regulatory responses to the economic crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, Japan, and Russia).
155. See generally BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REPORT TO THE G20 (2010), available
at http://www.bis.org/publbcbsl79.pdf (summarizing the Basel Committee's actions to strengthen
capital and other requirements).
156. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. June
2011) [hereinafter BASEL III CAPITAL STANDARDS], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
157. See WALTER W. EUBANKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41467, THE STATUS OF THE
BASEL III CAPITAL ADEQUACY ACCORD 12 (2010).
158. See BASEL III CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 156, 122-35, at 54-57. The new rules
encourage firms whose capital levels have fallen below the buffer limit to reduce shareholder dividends
and staff bonuses until the capital levels are restored. See id. TT 124, 126, at 54-55.
159. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS
ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 1 73, at 50 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20l.pdf, FIN.
STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 2-3 (2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_10111 1a.pdf. Firms that continue to grow or come
to pose more systemic risk could face even higher surcharges. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra, $T
68-69, at 13-14.
160. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
PROPOSAL TO ENSURE THE Loss ABSORBENCY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON-
VIABILITY (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl74.pdf.
161. BASEL III CAPITAL STANDARDS, supra note 156, 9, at 2 ("[T]he predominant form of
Tier 1 capital must be common shares and retained earnings."). The new Basel standards require banks
to maintain Common Equity Tier I of at least 4.5% of the sum of all risk-weighted assets. Id. 150, at 12.
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losses in the crisis,' 62 and imposing strict limits on the mileage that regulated
institutions can get from minority interests, 16 3 investments in other financial
institutions, mortgage servicing rights, and deferred tax assets.' 64
Basel ifi will also impose increased capital requirements on banks'
riskiest activities, and will affect trading positions and counterparty credit
exposures. Capital calculations for trading exposures must be based on stressed
market conditions,'6 5 and the charges for securitization exposures will be
increased substantially.1 66 In both derivatives and secured-lending transactions,
firms will be subject to a capital charge for deterioration in the creditworthiness
of counterparties.16 7 Basel III will introduce a new, internationally applied
leverage ratio requirement that includes firms' off-balance-sheet commitments
and exposures.168 The Committee will test a minimum leverage ratio
requirement of three percent initially, and announce the final requirement at the
beginning of 2017.169
Furthermore, Basel III will introduce explicit quantitative liquidity
requirements to ensure that financial firms are better prepared for liquidity
strains. Under the new rules, firms must hold enough liquid assets to meet
potential net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress scenario.170 The Basel
standards will also require a minimum amount of stable funding, relative to a
firm's assets, commitments, and obligations over a one-year period.17' These
requirements, once fully implemented, will be a crucial way to protect firms
from severe strains of the type that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers in 2008.
Although the Basel Committee's work to strengthen capital and liquidity
requirements is promising, the new requirements come with a lengthy transition
period.17 2 Supervisors must still determine final requirements for liquidity and
leverage ratios. Furthermore, while the private sector has made some progress
in reducing counterparty credit risks in the tri-party repo markets, I believe that
162. See id. 1 9, at 2 (discussing the elimination of "so-called Tier 3 capital instruments").
163. Id.1162-64, at 19-21.
164. See id. J 87-88, at 26 (capping maximum adjustment to Common Equity Tier 1 from
any one of these sources to ten percent and adjustments from all these sources in aggregate to fifteen
percent of a bank's common equity). Under Basel 11, banks could recognize the full amount of these
assets against Tier I capital. Id. 87, at 26.
165. Id.198, at 30.
166. See id. N 90, at 27 (requiring 1250% risk weight for "certain securitisation exposures,"
which could have been recognized as deductions from capital under Basel II).
167. Id.N99, at 31-37.
168. See id. IN 151-67, at 61-62.
169. Id.T153,at61.
170. BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 91, TT 15-19, at 3-4.
171. Id. $T 119-23, at 25-26.
172. The Basel Committee plans to phase in heightened capital requirements gradually over
the next eight years; all liquidity standards will take effect by January 1, 2018, and capital requirements
will reach their steady-state levels at the latest on January 1, 2019. See BASEL III CAPITAL STANDARDS,
supra note 156, at 69, annex 4.
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supervisors need to pay particular attention to the special liquidity and
counterparty credit risks that still face clearing banks in those markets. Finally,
although the federal government and the Financial Accounting Standards Board
have clarified how U.S. institutions are to calculate the measure of risk-
weighted assets that forms the denominator of the capital ratio, 173 there appears
to be a significant disparity among countries and financial firms in how this
variable is calculated. 74 Unless supervising bodies use the Basel process to
promote the agreed-upon approach for risk weighting, these disparities may
weaken the Basel III framework, leading to an unlevel playing field for U.S.
firms and races to the bottom in risk-taking.
2. Supervision and Resolution of SIFIs
Governments must do more to improve cross border supervision of the
world's largest financial institutions and end the perception in the international
community that some firms are too big to fail. Progress towards an effective
international framework for resolving SIFIs will require countries to implement
the high-level reforms agreed to by Group of Twenty (G20) leaders in
Toronto,' 75 as well as the more concrete recommendations of the Financial
Stability Board.17 6 While some European governments are focused on using
contingent capital as a means to improve resolution prospects, 17 7 an approach
173. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines and Other Related Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 4636 (Jan. 28,
2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, and 567); FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2009-16, TRANSFERS AND SERVICING (TOPIC
860): ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (2009),
http://www.fasb.orgljspfFASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156316498 (follow "Update No. 2009-16"
hyperlink, then select "Accept" button); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
UPDATE No. 2009-17, CONSOLIDATIONS (TOPIC 810): IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING BY
ENTERPRISES INVOLVED WITH VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES (2009),
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=l 176156316498 (follow "Update No. 2009-17"
hyperlink, then select "Accept" button).
174. See Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serys., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (manuscript at 8-9),
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/061611tarullo.pdf; THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP.,
EUROPE: BANKS: STILL NOT A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD; REGULATORY DIFFERENCES DRIVE RELATIVE
RETURNS (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-
policy/regulatory-reform/still-not-level-pdf.pdf, cf Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary Conference (June 6, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl202.aspx (recommending firther
safeguards to ensure consistent application of risk weightings across countries).
175. The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, annex II, In 18-20, June 26-27, 2010, available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20 declaration-en.pdf.
176. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 159.
177. See, e.g., COMM'N OF EXPERTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR
LIMITING THE ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 24-28 (2010), available at
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00522/00724/00725/index.htmllang-en (follow "Final report
of the 'too big to fail' commission of experts" hyperlink) (Switz.). The proposed Swiss plan requires
banks to hold contingent convertible bonds, or "CoCos," that would convert to common equity if capital
adequacy triggers are breached. Id. at 4. For an explanation of the actions taken at each stage of financial
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that may one day prove useful, these efforts are not enough. Contingent capital
will not be sufficient to allow the resolution of a major financial firm without
wide-scale harm to the markets and must not be used as an excuse to avoid
legislating strong resolution regimes internationally.
Much more can be done to improve cross border cooperation with respect
to resolution of SIFIs. Effective precrisis planning requires home and host
regulators to share information and agree to resolution plans."7 Today, such
information sharing is hampered by confidentiality and other use restrictions.179
Only a handful of jurisdictions have entered into cross border agreements on
financial firm resolution; 8 0 where such agreements do exist, they are often
non-binding and lack detail on crisis roles, responsibilities, and information-
sharing methods.' 8 ' The Dodd-Frank Act requires the FDIC, when acting as a
receiver under the Act's orderly liquidation authority, to coordinate with
foreign financial authorities "to the maximum extent possible."' 8 2 However,
few countries require regulators to cooperate internationally when winding
down a firml 8 3 -- indeed, only Australia (and, to a limited extent, the European
Union) has a similar statutory mandate. Governments should follow the
timelines recommended by the Financial Stability Board for enacting statutes
requiring cooperation with foreign regulators, and agree to institution-specific
resolution plans for each SIFI.s85 Resolution agreements should assign roles
and responsibilities to regulators both before and during crises, establish an
information-sharing framework, and commit to removing impediments to
orderly liquidation.'86
3. Regulation of Derivatives
Finally, the global community must enact common standards for
transparency, capital adequacy, oversight, and abuse prevention in the
derivatives markets. These standards should include international standards for
vulnerability, see id. at 51 fig.3. For a fuller discussion of contingent capital mechanisms, see generally
Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via "Reverse Convertible
Debentures," in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 171, 171-76 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005).
178. See BANK FOR INT'L SE'TTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP In 94-104, at 31-35
(2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl69.pdf.
179. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
RESOLUTION POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS: PROGRESS SO FAR T 164, at 33-34 (2011) [hereinafter CROSS
BORDER RESOLUTION PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs200.pdf
180. Id.1 167, at 34-35.
181. Id.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(N) (Supp. IV 2010).
183. CROSS BORDER RESOLUTION PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 179, 1 152, at 31-32.
184. Id.
185. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 159, f 15-16, 21-27, at 4-6.
186. For the full set of proposed recommendations on cross border resolution agreements, see
generally FIN. STABILITY BD., EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS
41-45 annex 3 (2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 110719.pdf.
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clearing and settlement, as well as cooperative supervisory arrangements for
critical OTC derivatives market infrastructure. Governments have agreed in
principle on the need for reform and on the broad components of such
reform,1 87 including central clearing, electronic and exchange trading, and
reporting to trade repositories. 188 The principles for financial market
infrastructure developed by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions' cover certain much-needed reforms, including initial and
variation margin requirements. 90 However, much remains to be done to align
the U.S., European, and Asian governments on specific reforms.' In
particular, the European Union appears to be holding back on implementing its
agreement to follow the United States in imposing margin requirements and in
moving standardized contracts to exchange trading and central clearing. 19 2
The modern financial system is global in scope, and the recent economic
crisis similarly reached across national boundaries. Effective solutions have
been and must continue to be global as well. International reforms must support
domestic efforts by strengthening capital and liquidity frameworks, improving
oversight of global financial markets, coordinating supervision of
internationally active firms, and providing enhanced crisis management tools.
The United States did not wait for the international community to act before
building a new foundation in the Dodd-Frank Act, and governments cannot
allow an international race to the bottom on regulatory standards to undermine
country-specific reforms.
187. Leaders of the G20 countries agreed in 2009 to implement OTC derivatives market
reforms by the end of 2012, see Leaders' Statement, G20, The Pittsburgh Summit, 1 13, at 9 (Sept. 24-
25, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-summitleadersstatement_250909.pdf, and in 2010
endorsed the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, see The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders'
Declaration 37, at 8 (Nov. 11-12, 2010), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummitdeclaration.pdf.
188. See FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPLEMENTING OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS (2010),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf.
189. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, PRINCIPLES FOR
FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2011), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD350.pdf.
190. See id. at 40-46.
191. Geithner, supra note 174. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET REFORMS: PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION 3-4 (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1 10415b.pdf (collecting reports).
192. Cf Letter from Wemer Langen, Member, Eur. Parliament, to Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.chathamfinancial.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/2011-06-14-Langen-letter-to-Geithner.pdf (demonstrating disagreements
between U.S. and European policymakers regarding the scope of G20 central clearing agreements).
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Conclusion
The United States had an urgent obligation to fix the failures that
threatened our financial system and helped trigger the worst global economic
crisis since the Great Depression and a recession that has cost American
families and businesses so dearly. The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act was a
historic achievement. It provides the government with the tools it needs to
monitor systemic risk and to supervise institutions and markets regardless of
whether they are in the banking or the "shadow banking" world. It provides for
comprehensive regulation of the derivatives markets. It provides the
government with the tools to wind down a major financial institution in the
event of distress while minimizing risks to the financial system and taxpayers.
And it establishes a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to establish a level
playing field for competition that protects consumers. The Act is not perfect-
no legislation is. Yet it puts in place the key reforms that were necessary to
establish a firm foundation for future financial stability and economic growth in
the decades ahead.
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